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approximation of functions of several variables, with the help of combinations of 
functions of one variable (The practical origin of this research is of course to be 
found in the needs for tabulating functions of several variables. This problem has 
been mostly studied by Kolmogoroff's chool and the fascinating result which he 
has obtained deserves to be better known: consider any function f(x, y) of two 
variables, continuous in the closed unit square; there exist five sets of functions 
Fi( '  ), g~ ('), and hl (.) of one variable, all continuous in the unit interval, such that 
one can write f(x, y) =~=1 Fi[gi(x) Jr hi(y)]. 
These various lines of investigation have been recently incorporated into a 
broad program, formulated by Kolmogoroff, of evaluating the "e-entropy" and 
the "e-capacity" of some interesting compact sets in function space. The present 
book is essentially a systematic presentation of the results obtained in this direc- 
tion between 1954 and 1958 by K. I. Babenko, W. D. Erochin, A. G. Wituschkin, 
W. I. Arnold, and other authors. The families of functions which they consider 
include functions of "finite smoothness," differentiable functions in L 2 space, 
analytic functions, analytic functions bounded on the real axis, e tc . . .  
The connections with the "probabilistic theory of information" (i.e., with 
communication theory) are expedited in a two-page appendix. 
There are promising signs that the amareness of the mathematical importance 
of the concepts of information theory has now reached the American school of 
pure mathematics, via the Stekloff Mathematical Institute. See the recent account 
by P. R. Halmos in Bull. Am. Math. Soc. 67, 74 (1961). 
Although Kolmogoroff and Tichomirow's book is unlikely to be of frequent 
usefulness to practically minded scientists or to engineers, it is of course a must 
in any l ibrary on information theory. 
BENOIT MANDELBROT 
I.B.M. Research Center 
Yorktown Heights, New York 
Measurement:  Definitions and Theories. Edited by C. WES~ CHURCHMAN AND 
lPHILBURN RATOOSH. Wiley, New York, 1959. viii zr 274 pp., $7.95. 
This book consists of papers presented at an A.A.A.S. symposium on measure- 
ment in 1956. The editors point out in their preface that in view of the widely 
different approaches which have developed in different disciplines and even among 
different investigators to problems of measurement, the book turned out to be one 
of contrasts. The contrasts are indeed apparent, most strikingly in the diversity 
of levels on which the problems are posed. At first sight, the problems appear to 
be so diverse as to seem disconnected. They range from the distinctly epistemolog- 
ieal (perhaps even metaphysical) problems forced upon the physicist by the un- 
certainty principle, through the methodological dilemmas of the psychologist 
who comes to grips with a program of translating intuitively posited quantities 
(subjective intensity, util ity, etc.) i~to measurable observables, to the pragmatic 
questions posed by the decision maker: "What should I measure, how, and how 
precisely to get sufficient information for a decision?" 
Nevertheless, the editors' hope of presenting a good picture "of what the 
workers in the foundations of measurement are concerned about" appears realized. 
Not only is the picture good but it is fairly unified (in spite of the contrasts) by a 
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thread of theoretical awareness which pervades the thoughtful and sophisticated 
articles. 
It would have been in order, perhaps, for the editors to point this theme out 
in a separate introductory paper. The article of one of the editors (C. 
West Churchman, "Why Measure?"), does not fulfill this purpose and was evi- 
dently not intended to do so, being included as one of the contributions instead 
of as an introduction. 
The most explicit statement of the unified point of view (which is implicitly 
contained in all of the articles) appears in the paper by H. Margenau ("Philo- 
sophica] Problems Concerning the Meaning of Measurement in Physics"). It 
reads: "Measurement s ands . . . at the critical junction between theory and the 
kind of experience often called sensory, immediate, datal." 
This is to say, as I understand it, that there is no science without theory and 
that therefore the disavowals of "theory" sometimes made by those who call 
themselves strict empiricists are unfounded. According to the broadest definition, 
measurement is "The assignment of numerals to aspects of objects or events ac- 
cording to rule (S. S. Stevens, 'Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility')." 
Thus even simple classification is "measurement" if numerals are assigned as 
indices to classes (as in numbering football players). Already this simple act of 
naming involves theoretical ssumptions (e.g., the law of identity). As the measur- 
ing scales become stronger, e.g., ordinal, interval, ratio, or dimensionless cales, 
so do the assumptions. Operational definitions, which emphasize the empirical 
content of concepts, involve assumptions concerning the invariance of results of 
repeated operations and concerning rules of correspondence. (Cf. A. Pap, "Are 
Physical Magnitudes Operationally Definable?") Statistical measures usually 
involve assumptions concerning underlying distributions, etc. Therefore, since 
measurement is an operation, on the basis of which observations are communi- 
cated unambiguously, and since the interpretation of the results of measurement 
involve theories, all scientific assertions are theoretical in the sense of being based 
on philosophical presuppositions. 
Theories of measurement, then, are concerned with uncovering and, if neces- 
sary, with defending or attacking the theoretical positions which underlie un- 
ambiguous communications of observations of a given kind. Such theoretical 
considerations suggest methodologies and techniques of measurement. According- 
ly the subject could be treated by progressing from theories of measurement 
through problems of methodology to techniques. 
It is, of course, too much to expect a dozen odd papers by as many authors 
to line themselves up neatly along this or any other axis. On the basis of the ma- 
terial at hand, the editors chose to divide the book into four parts: I. Some Mean- 
ings of Measurement; II. Some Theories of Measurement; II I. Some Problems in 
the Physical Sciences; IV. Some Problems in the Social Sciences. 
As the editors themselves point out, the papers in Parts I and I[ are practically 
interchangeable. Various meanings assigned to measurement constitute a goodly 
portion of measurement theory, and the theory is, in turn, concerned with un- 
covering the meaning and iustification of measuring operations. Part I[ I  is like- 
wise concerned with measurement theory, indeed with its most profound aspects, 
which came into focus in the light of the uncertainty principle and its various 
philosophical interpretations. The above-mentioned article by Margenau treats 
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the associated problems with clarity and force, while J. L. Knight ("The Quan- 
tum-Theoretical Concept of Measurement") gives a short but illuminating sum- 
mary of the several principal views on this matter. The reader who believes that 
the barrier to knowledge inherent in the uncertainty principle resides in the 
disturbance of the thing measured by the act of measurement will be sobered by 
the much greater intricacy of this problem as it is revealed in these discussions. 
As we pass from theories of measurement arising in physics to those arising in 
psychology, we encounter problems of another sort. The "rules," according to 
which numerals are to be assigned to aspects of objects or events, become much 
more diverse, because the events of psychological observations are much more 
diverse than those of physics. Often each investigator invents and announces his 
own "rules." Thus the question "What am I measuring?" becomes a constantly 
nagging voice of conscience of the experimental psychologist, especially if he 
works "above" the level of psychophysics. Here the knowledge of measurement 
scales of different specificities (ratio, interval, ordinal, etc.) and of statistics ap- 
propriate to the indication of the reliability of measurement becomes crucial. The 
subject is ably summarized by S. S. Stevens with emphasis on psychophysical 
measurements and determinations of utility. 
In discussing the latter problem (which had been dormant and recently revived 
by the proliferating interest in decision theory), Stevens proposes a frontal as- 
sault instead of or supplementary to the roundabout risky decision approach 
introduced by yon Neumann and Morgenstern. This direct (one is tempted to say 
"brutal") approach is exemplified by questions of the following sort: 
"Suppose I made you happy by giving you $10. HO~T much would I have to give 
you to make you twice as happy?" 
Stevens argues with some conviction against a summary dismissal of the pos- 
sible answers to such questions as meaningless. He takes into account he obvious 
objections, such as the seeming absurdity of estimating ratios on a "happiness" 
scale, the probable contamination of the answer by numerical magnitudes already 
assigned to the commodities, whose utilities are to be estimated (which pre- 
sumably would automatically stimulate the answer $20), etc. To Stevens' way 
of thinking there is no harm in trying the direct approach. Indeed he cites some 
data from limited experiments of this sort, and the answer is not predominantly 
$20! The median subject asks for $30-$50, and estimates about 0.2 of the original 
amount offered as making him "hMf as happy." 
Admittedly crude, the data support he hypothesis that for the median subject 
the utility of money varies as the square root of the amount, thus putting utility 
in the class of "prothetic" continua, in which subjective intensities vary as some 
power of the stimulus intensities. A discussion of this power law leads Stevens to 
the critique of Fechner's law [Cf. also his "To Honor Fechner and Repeal His 
Laws" Science 133, 80-86, (1961)]. 
A more penetrating, formally axiematized critique of the applicability of 
Fechner's law is given by R. D. Luce ("A Probabilistic Theory of Utility and Its 
Relationship to Fechnerian Scaling").* 
Other discussions of measurement theory on the level of purely logical and 
* In this connection, the interested reader is referred to Luce's highly relevant 
paper "On the Possible Psychophysical Laws." Psychol Rev. 66, 81-144 (1959). 
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mathematical considerations are found in papers by K. Menger ("Mensuration 
and Other Mathematical Connections of Observable Material"), P. Suppes 
("Measurement, Empirical Meaningfulness, and Three-Valued Logic") and P. 
Caws ("Definition and Measurement in Physics"). 
Part IV includes two papers, one by C. H. Coombs ("Inconsistency of Prefer- 
ences as a Measure of Psychological Distance") and one by D. Davidson and J. 
Marschak ("Experimental Tests of a Stochastic Decision Theory"). Both deal 
essentially with decision theory, specifically with the derivation on the basis of a 
postulated stochastic process of a psychological scale supposedly underlying the 
generation of decision data. 
Since the 1956 symposium, the literature on this topic has been voluminous. 
Some references cited at the end of the articles by Lace and by Davidson and 
Marschak carry through 1959. For the most part, however, the reader interested in
measurement theory as it applies to decision theory will have to seek an up-to- 
date bibliography elsewhere. 
The problem of measurement is put directly into the context of action decision 
by C. W. Churchman ("Why Measure?"), who takes measurement as a "decision- 
making activity designed to accomplish an objective," and by P. Kireher ("Meas- 
urements and Managerial Decisions"), who lists the magnitudes which are of 
interest in the management of a business (comparisons with standard costs, 
production schedules, optimum reorder quantities, etc.) and the associated 
methodological problems. 
E. J. Gumbel ("Measurement of Rare Events") gives a sketch of the theory 
of extreme values and their engineering applications. He then proceeds to refute 
the claims of the occultists by citing a comparison of guess successes of self- 
styled "radiesthetists" with chance events. It seems to me that a crituque of 
statistical methods used in evaluating the results of ESP experiments would 
have been more relevant to a discussion of the interesting and little-known theory 
of rare events. 
Measurement is to be recommended as a source book to students of epistemology 
and of the philosophy of science. It contains many good points of departure, and 
the reader will be encouraged to start in further pursuit of a topic which becomes 
of special interest o him. Students in experimental psychology are expected or, 
at any rate, ought to be familiar with the issues raised in the papers dealing with 
that content area. 
I take the liberty of calling attention to a sc rambled  sentence, probab ly  due  
to a printing error, in the first paragraph on p. 86. 
ANATOL RAPOPORT 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
The Physical Foundation of Biology. By WAL$~R M. E~SASSER. Pergamon 
Press, New York, 1958. 219 pp., $4.75. 
This book is likely to be of some interest o the readers of this iournal. It is 
regrettable that, like several others relating the notions of information and con- 
trol to the "soft sciences" (e. g. Sommerhoff, 1950), it seems to have escaped the 
widespread attention received, for example, by SehrSdinger's (1944) "What is 
